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Kabul	and	Monrovia,	the	respective	capitals	of	Afghanistan	and	Liberia,	have	recently	emerged	
from	long-lasting	armed	conflicts.	In	both	cities,	a	large	number	of	organisations	took	part	in	
emergency water supply provision and later in the rehabilitation of water systems. Based on field 
research, this paper establishes a parallel between the operations carried out in the two settings, 
highlighting similarities and analysing the two most common strategies. The first strategy involves 
international financial institutions, which fund large-scale projects focusing on infrastructural 
rehabilitation and on the institutional development of the water utility, sometimes envisaging 
private-sector participation. The second strategy involves humanitarian agencies, which run 
community-based projects, in most cases independently of the water utilities, and targeting low-
income areas. Neither of these approaches manages to combine sustainability and universal service. 
The	paper	assesses	their	respective	strengths	and	weaknesses	and	suggests	ways	of	improving	the	
quality of assistance provided.
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Introduction
Kabul and Monrovia are two very different cities with little in common apart from 
being the capitals of their respective countries, Afghanistan and Liberia. Yet their 
recent history reveals a tragic similarity: both have suffered, almost simultaneously, 
from the burden of years of war. With respect to the unfolding of events, the parallels 
are remarkable:
•	 The	year	1992 saw Mujahideen fighters enter Kabul, after the withdrawal of the 
Soviet army. Almost immediately, a four­year power struggle between rival factions 
began that left some 20,000 people dead and large portions of the city destroyed 
(Johnson, 2004). In the same year, Monrovia came under attack by rebel forces 
led by Charles Taylor, causing destruction and generating mayhem among the 
thousand of displaced persons who had fled war in the provinces.
•	 In	1996, the Taliban (a Sunni Islamist, predominately Pashtun movement of ‘stu­
dents’) took Kabul and Taylor’s forces attacked Monrovia. In the following months, 
peace returned to both countries, at least to the capitals. In Liberia, a presidential 
election was organised and resulted in a landslide victory for Taylor.
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•	 In	2001, Kabul was bombed again, this time by the United States. The city fell 
in only a few days, and the Taliban regime collapsed. Less than two years later, 
Taylor’s opponents swiftly took over Monrovia, forcing the president to go into 
exile. 
  Since then, Afghanistan and Liberia have both experienced a transition towards 
democracy under the guidance of the United Nations (UN). However, while Liberia 
seems to be on the pathway to stability, Afghanistan remains at war in its southern 
provinces.
  Long­term wars such as those in Afghanistan and Liberia affect cities in many ways. 
The damage to urban infrastructure is the most apparent product but communities 
and institutions also suffer. A common consequence is disruption to essential services 
such as the water supply. In Kabul and Monrovia, the emergencies led to interven­
tions by a number of humanitarian organisations that contributed to the partial 
restoration of water supplies. Later came the start of efforts to rehabilitate the water 
networks in both cities, which were ongoing in September 2007. 
  This paper draws a parallel between restorations of the water supply in the two 
cities. Its aim is to show that, in addition to aid agencies and water utilities, com­
munities of consumers have important roles to play in the delivery of water in an 
environment transformed by war. The discussion suggests answers to questions 
regarding how their respective involvements influence the outcome of projects. The 
paper concludes by presenting possible ways of improving strategies to maximise the 
benefits of interventions by aid agencies. 
Research methodology
Kabul and Monrovia were identified as the most significant components of a wider 
case study research project that also looked at cities and towns in Chechnya, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, and Sri Lanka. They were selected to take 
account of a wide range of elements of emergency situations, including type and 
intensity of armed conflict, geography, and the nature of interventions by aid agen­
cies. The research focused on interventions by different categories of aid agencies, 
and covered several types of projects, with various levels of involvement by water 
utilities and communities of consumers. These interventions were chosen as the unit 
of study—that is, the nature of the ‘cases’. The outcome was then evaluated in 
terms of service sustainability and coverage, in particular for areas sheltering the 
most vulnerable. The data reported was taken essentially from unpublished reports 
and from field visits carried out in 2005. During the field visits, water utilities’ offi­
cials, community leaders, and members of aid agencies were interviewed. Questions 
posed concentrated on the consequences of war for the water supply and on the kind 
of interaction among aid agencies, water utilities, and communities in relation to the 
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Kabul, Monrovia and their water supplies
Green (2000, p. 343) describes rehabilitation as restoring ‘the same level of func­
tionality as before the crisis’. In the case of Kabul and Monrovia, this task seems 
virtually impossible because war has transformed these cities to such an extent that 
their appearance, infrastructure, institutions, population, and size post­crisis are very 
different from what they were before. A more appropriate definition here would 
be to adapt the ‘level of functionality’ to the new situation. This section describes 
the transformation of these cities, concentrating on the water supply and on how 
aid agencies responded to the resulting emergency situations.
Kabul
Although Afghanistan has been at war since 1978, Kabul was spared until the with­
drawal of Soviet troops on 15 February 1989. At that time, its population numbered 
around 1.3 million.
1 A water network fed mainly from a mixture of boreholes and 
surface water supplied approximately 60 per cent of these people. The boreholes 
feeding the network were either part of three main well fields located on the south­
ern fringe of the city (see Figure 1), or individual wells. Certain neighbourhoods, 
inside the city and on its periphery, were not connected to the main water network 
Figure 1 Kabul’s main water production sources and extension of the master plan 
Note: a ‘Karez’ is an underground canal. 
Source: based on a map by the Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS), http://www.aims.org.af.A tale of two cities 577
and had independent water schemes. Total water production in 1988 was estimated 
at 86,000 cubic metres (m3) per day (Banks and Hamid, 2002). The network had 
30,000 individual connections, half of them metered. Water was available for between 
six and eight hours a day, on a regular schedule. Households not supplied with 
piped water relied on public and private shallow wells. The development of the 
water network was according to a master plan designed in the mid­1970s. Figure 1 
shows the portion of the city supplied by the central water network, according to 
this master plan.
  The public utility, Central Authority for Water Supply and Sewerage (CAWSS), 
was in charge of running the water supply and sewerage system in Kabul. It was also 
responsible for implementing works to develop the Kabul water network, according 
to the master plan. The institution was almost self­financing, with only 10 per cent 
of its budget coming from central government.
  When fighting erupted around Kabul soon after the Soviet withdrawal in February 
1989, the Afshar and Logar well fields were looted almost immediately. Water pro­
duction fell sharply to 25–30,000 m3/day (Banks and Hamid, 2002). The situation 
worsened after April 1992, when the Mujahideen took the city. The power supply 
was then halted totally and the pumping stations plundered. People could only 
obtain water from shallow wells and from the Qargha ‘Karez’, an underground 
canal, which was producing less than 5,000 m3/day. Heavy fighting continued inter­
mittently until 1994 and some 500,000 people abandoned the city. From 1994, a 
reduction in the intensity of hostilities allowed aid organisations including Care, 
Solidarités and the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS)­
Habitat to intervene (Solidarités, 1995). Their operations initially consisted of water 
trucking and the construction of more than 2,000 public shallow wells, most of which 
were boreholes equipped with handpumps (Pinera, 1999). Essential repairs to the 
Afshar and Allaudin well fields and to some individual wells supplying the network 
were later carried out, allowing water production to reach an estimated 15,000 m3/
day (see Figure 2). This reduced level of production was maintained until the fall 
of the Taliban at the end of 2001. The CAWSS, which used to employ 400 staff in 
Kabul, including 34 engineers, lost most 
of its qualified personnel and all of its 
equipment and vehicles. 
  Kabul’s infrastructure suffered heavy 
damage during the war, with its south­
west quarter being literally flattened. 
When a large number of people re­
turned home from abroad after the 
demise of the Taliban regime, many 
found their houses partially or com­
pletely destroyed and initiated their 
reconstruction. Some settled down in 
abandoned buildings or in improvised 
camps in certain neighbourhoods. The 
Figure 2 Population movement and water 
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construction of new houses on the outskirts of the capital also contributed to the 
city’s expansion, while the slopes of the group of hills in the centre were covered 
with more houses. Most of these families occupied areas not included in Kabul’s 
master plan (see Figure 1). New densely populated neighbourhoods were created 
where people, among the poorest in the city, lived. In less than two years, the city’s 
population grew from almost 1.8 million under the Taliban
2 to an estimated 2.8 
million in 2004 (Grinnell and Troc, 2004). 
  Figure 2 shows the evolution of Kabul’s water supply and population throughout 
the crisis.
Monrovia
Liberia became politically unstable from the mid­1970s, when the country suffered 
a severe recession followed by a bloody coup (in April 1980). In this difficult con­
text, the water utility, Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC), still managed 
to serve 75 per cent of the Monrovia area using 17,900 individual connections, of 
which 45 per cent were metered (Willson, 2003). Households not connected to the 
water network were relying on a few public taps and on a large number of private 
shallow wells. The White Plains treatment plant, located 15 kilometres northeast 
of the capital, on the Saint Paul River (see Figure 3), ensured water production. Its 
average daily production was 61,000 m3/day (Willson, 2003). 
  When a rebellion against the government reached the surroundings of Monrovia 
in April 1990, the water supply from White Plains was among the first services to 
suffer and cease production. Organisations including the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC), Médecins sans Frontières­Belgium (MSF­Belgium), and 
the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) intervened to support the LWSC and 
managed the resumption of water production to 22,500–37,500 m3/day (Ockleford, 
1993; Smith et al., 2001). Along with other organisations, they constructed a large 
number of public wells equipped with handpumps. A new interruption to the water 
supply occurred during the October 1992 attack and was not corrected until the 
end of 1993, when Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
installed power generators at White Plains. The same year, MSF­Belgium, supported 
by GTZ, drilled two boreholes in Paynesville, an area situated east of the city (Smith 
and Kpakolo, 2004). Damage to the transmission line did not allow the water supply 
from White Plains to be restored beyond Bushrod Island (see Figure 3), a densely 
populated area located north of the city, to which between 7,100 and 7,500 m3 of water 
was delivered daily (Smith et al., 2001; Geoscience, 1998). Since then, water trucks or 
wheelbarrow vendors have distributed a large portion of drinking water, either from 
the water network through Bushrod Island outlets or from Paynesville boreholes. 
  In 2003, production at White Plains dropped further, to slightly more than 3,500 
m3/day, due to a lack of fuel (Smith and Kpakolo, 2004). The LWSC, in the same way 
as the CAWSS, lost most of its qualified personnel and assets. The situation changed 
in mid­2006 when the newly elected government carried out major repairs to the 
transmission line, resulting in a substantial increase in water production and allow­
ing water again to reach Central Monrovia after almost 15 years of interruption. A tale of two cities 579
Figure 3 Monrovia main water supply sources
  War in Monrovia caused far less destruction than in Kabul because rockets were 
used only during the short crisis of 2003. However, Monrovia, like Kabul, experi­
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million in 2005 (Smith and Kpakolo, 
2004). This was due to the influx of 
tens of thousand of people fleeing the 
devastation  in  the  countryside  after 
months of conflict. They settled in the 
capital and in the camps surrounding it. 
These camps received 200,000 people 
between 1992 and 1995 (Atkinson and 
Mulbah, 2000). A large proportion of 
newcomers to Monrovia went to the 
shantytowns located along the Mesurado 
River’s swamp (see Figure 3). They also 
built  houses  in  the  peripheral  area, 
thereby contributing to the extension 
of the city beyond its original limits. These new settlements are part of what is 
known as ‘Greater Monrovia’. 
  Figure 4 shows the evolution of Monrovia’s water supply and population through­
out the crisis.
Different approaches to the rehabilitation  
of water supply systems 
Once the situations in Kabul and Monrovia seemed to have stabilised, a number of 
organisations initiated the rehabilitation of the water supply systems using similar 
strategies in both cities. One can distinguish two types of intervention:
•	 Large-scale	rehabilitation	projects,	supported	by	bilateral	and/or	multilateral	donor	
organisations, initiated as soon as the political environment was considered suit­
able. These actors adopted a more global approach aiming to improve durably the 
whole system of water production, distribution and management. They also planned 
institutional reforms.
•	 Rehabilitation	works	on	a	relatively	modest	scale,	mostly	carried	out	by	interna­
tional non­governmental organisations (NGOs) that had also participated in the 
emergency operations. Their main objective was to avoid outbreaks of commu­
nicable diseases due to the deterioration in access to water, sanitation and health 
services, especially in the most congested areas.
  These strategies were expected to contribute to the improved efficiency of the 
water service. 
Kabul
Essential repairs to the water network started from 1995 when the NGOs Care, 
Oxfam and Solidarités performed repairs to pumping stations, part of the main 
Figure 4 Population movement and water 
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water network, and some of the independent water schemes. From 2002, the ICRC 
and German government­owned development bank Kreditanstalt	für	Wiederaufbau 
(KfW), through the German consulting firm RRI­Beller/Kocks (KfW, Phase I), 
became involved. By 2005, water production was restored to 45,000 m3/day (see 
Figure 2) and the number of house connections returned to the pre­war level of 
43,000. Table 1 provides more details on these operations.
  From 2003, the rehabilitation of the Kabul water network on a large scale could 
be planned, starting with a feasibility study, funded by KfW, and carried out by 
RRI­Beller/Kocks. Based on its conclusions, KfW, together with the World Bank, 
funded a €100 million rehabilitation of the water network (KfW, Phase II), which 
included drilling and equipping 26 new deep wells with the objective of producing a 
daily average of 121,000 m3 of water by 2010 (Fischaess, 2003). The project planned 
to turn the CAWSS into a state corporation, accountable to a board of directors 
instead of to the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing. Its branches, in 13 
cities and towns, were meant to acquire greater autonomy and it was envisaged that 
‘independent service providers’, ‘publicly, privately, or cooperatively owned’, would 
take part in the service (MUDH, 2005).
  In parallel with these large­scale rehabilitation and institutional development plans, 
a number of organisations, primarily NGOs, carried out community­based projects 
expected to have a swift impact on living conditions in the poorest areas. They 
targeted neighbourhoods outside the master plan since, in the short and medium 
Table 1 Major essential rehabilitation projects to the Kabul water network
Organisation Operation Period Result/references
Care Rehabilitation of pumping 
stations in Afshar well field
1995 (six months) Handed over to Solidarités
Solidarités Operation, repair and main-
tenance of pumping stations 
(including Afshar) and 
independent networks in 
Kabul and along its periphery
1995–98 Interrupted  
(Solidarités, 1995)
Care Rehabilitation of two well 
fields, including Allaudin
1996–2006 Handed over to the CAWSS 
(planned)
Oxfam Logar well field rehabilitation 1997–99 Interrupted  
(Cosgrave, 1999)
ICRC Logar well field electrifica-
tion (with the British Red 
Cross Society)
2002–03 Completed (Elliott, 2002)
Works in five areas of 
Kabul network, including 
Afshar (with the Spanish 
Red Cross Society)
2002–03 Completed  
(Diago and Arnalich, 2004)
KfW/RRI-Beller/Kocks Urgent repairs on Kabul 
network (KfW, Phase I)
2002–05 Completed (KfW, 2003)Jean-François Pinera and Robert A. Reed  582 
term, it was not expected that the main water network would supply them (Pinera 
and Rudge, 2006). Some of these neighbourhoods were served by independent 
water schemes, usually consisting of a borehole and a number of tap stands. While 
theoretically the responsibility of the CAWSS, they were in practice left to the com­
munities to manage. Only a small proportion of the population living in ‘unplanned’ 
areas benefited from water schemes, with the majority relying on public or private 
shallow wells, sometimes equipped with handpumps. 
  The projects run by organisations such as the ICRC and the French NGOs Action 
Contre la Faim (ACF) and Solidarités comprised:
•	 constructing and rehabilitating water points/systems, usually boreholes equipped 
with handpumps or existing water schemes;
•	 training mechanics to repair them;
•	 building or rehabilitating private latrines;
•	 organising hygiene promotion (house­to­house visits, sessions in schools and 
mosques, focus group sessions etc.); and
•	 encouraging the creation of water committees to manage the operation and main­
tenance of the systems (handpumps or small­scale water schemes).
  Kabul municipality and the CAWSS had little or no interest in these projects.
Monrovia
GTZ, the ICRC, MSF­Belgium and UNICEF were involved initially in making 
essential repairs to the water supply system. This task was continued from 1996 by the 
Florence­based consulting firm, Geoscience, funded by the European Development 
Fund (EDF). Table 2 provides more details. 
  While these repairs and the support provided to the LWSC contributed to a slow 
down in the deterioration of Monrovia’s water production capacity, they failed to 
reverse the trend.
  After the fall of Taylor’s regime in August 2003, a large­scale rehabilitation of the 
water supply was envisaged. A number of studies, among them a water demand and 
market study, were carried out in 2004 (Browne and Tsikisayi, 2004) and led to the 
launch of a €3 million rehabilitation project, funded by the European Union (EU) 
and awarded to the German consulting firm Hydroplan. One of the main objec­
tives of this project was a complete overhaul of the water treatment plant and of the 
transmission lines carrying water to the city (see Figure 3). The project also foresaw 
the drilling of new boreholes in the Paynesville area. The EU’s project recommended 
the delegation of the management of the city’s water supply to the private sector 
through concessions. This option involved making private companies responsible for 
the operation and maintenance of the utility’s assets as well as for necessary invest­
ments in the infrastructure (World Bank, 1997). The LWSC would however remain 
responsible for water production, quality control, and primary distribution through 
the transmission line. It would also distribute water in areas of Monrovia where A tale of two cities 583
concession would not be viable because of low­income levels and/or insufficient 
population density. The process was initiated in March 2005 but the new govern­
ment that came to power in February 2006 opted to halt it. It questioned the process 
of privatisation and decided to test the project in the richest areas—community­
based management of public stand­posts was preferred in low­income neighbourhoods. 
Implementation was ongoing in mid­2007.
  Community­based projects aimed at preventing outbreaks of cholera were also 
carried out in Monrovia by organisations such as the ACF, Concern, the ICRC, 
Oxfam and UNICEF. In the peri­urban areas of Monrovia (Greater Monrovia; see 
Figure 3), their activities were similar to those implemented in Kabul, with the 
difference that in Monrovia, community­based organisations (CBOs) played a promi­
nent role in community mobilisation. The relief agencies active in central areas of 
Monrovia tended to focus on ensuring fair access to the water sold by trucks and 
small vendors. For this purpose, Oxfam and UNICEF distributed water reservoirs, 
ranging from approximately 1,000–11,000 litres in volume, to be managed by com­
munities that purchased water from bulk suppliers and agreed a selling price.
  Oxfam’s project in Clara Town, a densely populated, low­income area of Bushrod 
Island, deserves special attention since it dealt with illegal water vendors. In 2004, 
it was estimated that up to 60 per cent of White Plains’ water was unaccounted for 
(Smith and Kpakolo, 2004). Part of the problem was due to leaks, but the main 
cause was water sellers illegally connecting to the network. Low pressure in the 
network obliged them to fill water vessels from the bottom of holes they dug to 
pierce the pipes. The conditions in which they sold water were very unhygienic. 
Since the network was not constantly under pressure, it could be contaminated 
through seepage from surface water accumulating in the holes. Criminal gangs often 
controlled these vendors, and, for an international NGO, it was difficult to work 
in such an environment. Oxfam, though, had been able to intervene in Clara Town 
Table 2 Essential major rehabilitation projects to the Monrovia water network
Organisation Operation Period Result/references
MSF-Belgium/UNICEF Support to the water utility, 
repairs to power supply
1990–91 Handed over to the ICRC 
(Ockelford, 1993)
ICRC Support to the water utility, 
repairs to power supply. 
Support for water produc-
tion (six months)
1991 Completed  
(Smith et al., 2001)
EDF/GTZ/MSF-Belgium Drilling of Paynesville bore-
holes, repairs (including the 
installation of generators) 
to White Plains water treat-
ment plant
1993 Completed  
(Smith et al., 2001)
EDF/Geoscience Essential repairs on water 
network and support for 
the LWSC
1996–2003 Completed (Geoscience, 
1998; Smith, 2001; 2004)Jean-François Pinera and Robert A. Reed  584 
since mid­2005, in partnership with a CBO. The agency selected 30 of these illegal 
vendors and signed an agreement with the LWSC whereby they were recognised 
and equipped with water meters. Water sellers received from Oxfam appropriate 
plastic water tanks, allowing them to sell water throughout the day. Moreover, the 
connections to the network were improved to avoid contamination (Oxfam, 2005). 
  The project was planned to run in collaboration with the LWSC. This choice was 
a singular one for the community­based projects (whether in Kabul or Monrovia), 
promoting autonomous water sources such as community wells, which were inde­
pendent of the municipal water supply. These projects were beneficial in terms of 
social cohesion, which is particularly important in societies emerging from armed 
conflict, but they did not contribute to increasing the coverage or the quality of 
municipal services.
Discussion: achieving a sustainable service  
for all consumers
The concept of ‘quality’ applied to the delivery of humanitarian assistance has gained 
momentum in the past 15 years or so, along with the related notion of ‘humanitarian 
assistance accountability’. This is mostly due to the increase in the number of emer­
gency operations and relief agencies and in the amount of funds spent during this 
period (Macrae, 2002). As mentioned in the methodology section, the quality of the 
assistance obtained by the interventions considered was measured, for this research, 
in terms of sustainability and coverage. Sustainability refers to the capacity of the 
activity supported by the project to carry on producing outputs when external assist­
ance is withdrawn. Coverage considers the share of the targeted population that is 
actually in receipt of the assistance. Analysing these parameters is particularly rel­
evant for the rehabilitation of water systems in urban areas affected by armed con­
flict because they are reflected in the two types of intervention mentioned above. 
Large­scale interventions are concerned with services that are sustainable, albeit 
sometimes for a minority of consumers, while community­based projects prioritise 
access coverage.
Sustainable services and privatisation
Strengthening the capacity of the water utility is essential for obtaining sustainable 
results, especially when water utilities are weakened. Through institutional devel­
opment initiatives, they may acquire the financial, managerial and technical capacity 
to run the service and to make appropriate strategic choices. 
  Sohail, Cavill and Cotton (2005) further analyse the nature of urban services’ sus­
tainability, dividing it into three components:
•  technical sustainability, linked to the capacity of the utility to operate and main­
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•	 financial	sustainability,	which	relies	on	its	capacity	to	recover	costs;	and
•  institutional sustainability, which depends on its credibility as a service provider 
with regard to both consumers and local administrations.
  Institutional development requires close collaboration with governmental agen­
cies, which is only possible when aid agencies and donors consider them as acceptable 
partners. It can be a difficult task and corruption often adds to the problem. In spite 
of these challenges, such initiatives have taken place and institutional reforms of 
water services were launched in Kabul and Monrovia. 
  In Kabul, where they are most advanced, it took three years for a ‘vision’ for the 
institutional development of the water utility to be conceptualised (MUDH, 2005), 
and it may take even longer for it to be fully implemented. The selected option for 
improving the efficiency of the service was to rely on ‘service providers’, a way of 
limiting the number and diversity of tasks to be conducted by a weak water utility. 
Policymakers considered different types of possible ‘service providers’ but, according 
to the manager of the KfW­funded project, the likely option was a management con­
tract granted to a private company.
3
  In Monrovia, the choice of going for concessions is an even bolder one, largely 
questioned by the new management of the LWSC that took over after February 
2006. In the short term, it is hard to imagine a Liberian company running the 
service, let alone investing in the infrastructure. International water companies are 
hardly an option since they are unlikely to be inclined to invest in a country barely 
emerging from civil war. Assuming that companies are found to run concessions 
in Monrovia, there is a risk that they will neglect less profitable low­income areas, 
which will remain the territory of water vendors where people buy water at prices 
up to 20 times higher than LWSC private costumers. 
  Private­sector participation in urban water supply is a common practice in the 
developed world. It has been tested in Africa with mixed results (Hall, Bayliss and 
Lobina, 2002; Stren, 2001; Batley, 2001). In countries affected by war or long­
lasting political instability, obstacles seem even greater than anywhere else. With 
increased urban poverty, shattered infrastructure and weak institutions, achieving 
profitability is certainly a greater challenge for a private company than in countries 
with ‘only’ weak economic prospects. 
  Opponents of privatisation argue that it comes with a substantial rise in water 
tariffs and, as mentioned in the case of Monrovia, only well­off families, living in 
determined areas, would be covered and could afford the service (Balanyá et al., 
2005). Others, however, contend that well­designed privatisations can also benefit 
the poor (Alexander, Rosenthal and Brocklehurst, 2002). The debate is open and 
Kabul is a perfect illustration of what is at stake. A majority of its inhabitants live 
in areas not covered by the master plan and consequently not supplied by the cen­
tral network. So far, the public water utility has mostly ignored them and no global 
solution is envisaged to address the problem. It seems unlikely that the residents of 
these areas would be able or willing to meet the costs related to their connection to 
the networks. An increase in water tariffs in 2005 by the public utility—even before Jean-François Pinera and Robert A. Reed  586 
any privatisation was officially envisaged—was received with complaints, in a country 
where water is considered by most as a ‘gift of God’. 
Reaching the most in need
The community­based projects carried out by aid agencies in low­income areas 
intend to respond to these concerns since they target such areas. However, most of 
them are not adapted to the urban environment and may have limited benefits in 
the long term. The organisations running these projects are usually experienced in 
emergency operations and/or rural water supply but most of them lack experience 
in dealing with local institutions. Instead, they tend to prefer locally maintained, 
individual systems. These systems have the advantage of being quick to install and some­
times offer much­needed instant relief. But there is no guarantee of quality and 
continuity of the service beyond what communities are able to ensure. Furthermore, 
a community­based approach that works in rural areas and/or in a displaced persons 
camp is not necessarily applicable in urban neighbourhoods sometimes traumatised 
by violence. Monrovia and Kabul, in their respective ways, consist of a mixture of 
groups of different ethnic, religious and political backgrounds in which confrontation, 
violence and gang culture have sometimes replaced solidarity and mutual trust. 
  Agencies willing to work in such contexts cannot always expect community 
participation, but they may assist in extending municipal water services to low­
income communities. This may consist of helping establish a working relationship 
between informal vendors and the water utility. Oxfam’s project in Clara Town is 
a case in point. Another possibility is helping communities to set up their own 
management of water distribution in their neighbourhood. This model has been 
applied in another city affected by armed conflict: Port­au­Prince, the capital of Haiti 
(Colin and Lockwood, 2002). Its water utility, Centrale Autonome Métropolitaine 
d’Eau Potable (CAMEP), never considered supplying the 800,000 urban poor living 
in the city’s many shantytowns, until that is the intervention of the French NGO 
Groupe de Recherche et d’Echange Technologique (GRET). Between 1995 and 2005, 
the organisation extended the city water network to these areas, building a number 
of kiosks from which water was sold to residents. Water management committees 
were elected in each neighbourhood and were put in charge of running these kiosks, 
paying the sellers and buying water in bulk quantities from CAMEP, thereby main­
taining affordable tariffs (Matthieussent and Carlier, 2004). This operation not only 
contributed to improving water access but also to restoring a sense of citizenship 
among shantytown residents as they gained access to the municipal service. 
Conclusion
This tale of two cities reveals comparable approaches to the rehabilitation of water sup­
ply despite very different cultures, natural environments and historical backgrounds. 
Many of the characters are similar in both areas: the run­down water utility, the 
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consultancy firm, the ‘emergency’ aid agencies—NGOs, the Red Cross or UN 
bodies—and of course, the divided communities. The strategies adopted also look 
alike: large­scale rehabilitation projects, funded by KfW and the World Bank in 
Kabul and by the EU in Monrovia, alongside community­based projects run by 
NGOs, the ICRC and UNICEF. Similar accounts could be given of many other 
cities emerging from war.
  Both in Kabul and Monrovia, the outcome of interventions may be called into 
question vis­à­vis the issues of sustainability and coverage. Large­scale rehabilita­
tion projects may contribute to the institutional development of the water utility, 
which should ensure the durability of the service, but they are unlikely to cover 
disenfranchised neighbourhoods in the foreseeable future. In this respect, the pros­
pects are even worse if privatisation projects go ahead. In contrast, community­
based schemes target such areas but usually rely on locally maintained systems, 
with no guarantee of quality and long­term sustainability. These variables appear 
to be linked more to whether the agencies involved are skilled and/or capable of 
action than to the actual needs of the community concerned. Private consulting 
firms such as RRI­Beller/Kocks in Kabul and Hydroplan in Monrovia are more at 
ease with conventional water distribution with individual connections than with 
custom­made solutions aimed at serving areas that ACF in Kabul described as ‘left 
behind’. Water utilities tend to think along the same lines since individual connec­
tions are, in principle, more likely to generate income. In contrast, humanitarian 
agencies prefer to deal with communities, as they do in rural areas or in camps, than 
with governmental institutions. They also rely on funding schemes designed to sup­
port short­term, quick­impact interventions with a limited long­term perspective. 
  In these conditions, little can be done to reduce the gap in access to water services 
widened by war. A more holistic approach requires a much needed paradigm shift:
•	 It	is	essential	that	interventions	simultaneously	target	hardware,	institutional	
development and social aspects. Working efficiently at the neighbourhood level 
requires dealing with all stakeholders. This means not only rehabilitating infra­
structure and ensuring that the water utility has the capacity to run it—or even 
manage a delegated service—but also taking care of the social aspects including 
community consultation and hygiene promotion.
•	 One	should	understand	that	there	is	no	‘magic	bullet’	able	to	respond	to	all	situ­
ations in the same way. Certain neighbourhoods may benefit from a particular 
level of ‘private­sector participation’, while in others, a different model, such as 
community management, may be the answer.
•	 Finally,	an	appropriate	leadership	that	would	coordinate	the	inputs	of	all	organisa­
tions, whether involved in large­scale or community­based projects, is necessary. 
Ideally, it is a task for governments and their public utilities. Unfortunately, they 
are often too weak to play this prominent role unless genuine efforts are made 
to strengthen them. Donors, which often fund both large­scale and community­
based water supply rehabilitation, are in the best position to encourage this co­
operation, provided that they are aware of the problem. Jean-François Pinera and Robert A. Reed  588 
  This paradigm shift was partly achieved in Port­au­Prince, where CAMEP with 
the intermediation of GRET has managed to ensure water supply in many of its 
shantytowns. Could this occur in Kabul and Monrovia? It is hard to answer this 
question with certainty. Long years of poor service and weak institutional capacity 
have made the task difficult, but success was just as improbable before GRET started 
its programme in Port­au­Prince. Moreover, peace prospects, at least in Monrovia, 
are important assets. It may be time for aid agencies, consulting firms and major 
donors to establish a dialogue, under the auspices of the water utility, to agree on 
how to extend the benefits of municipal water services, whether through community­
based initiatives or private management. This alone would allow them to address a 
situation described in Port­au­Prince as one in which ‘needs are urgent, but for the 
long term and not emergency needs’ (Braïlowsky, Boisgallais and Paquot, 2000, p. 7), 
a description that could apply to almost any city emerging from armed conflict. 
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Endnotes
1  1986 figures; source: Central Statistics Office, Afghanistan, http://www.aims.org.af.
2  1999 figures; source: UNCHS­Habitat.
3  Personal communication with the author.
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